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HARDWARE SECURITY OF THE CAN BUS
Abstract
The CAN bus is a multi-master network messaging protocol that is a standard across the
vehicular industry to provide intra-vehicular communications. Electronics Control Units within
vehicles use this network to exchange critical information to operate the car. With the advent of
the internet nearly three decades ago, and an increasingly inter-connected world, it is vital that
the security of the CAN bus be addressed and built up to withstand physical and non-physical
intrusions with malicious intent. Specifically, this paper looks at the concept of node identifiers
and how they allow the strengths of the CAN bus to shine while also increasing the level of
security provided at the data-link level.
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Hardware Security of the CAN Bus
Introduction
The Controller Area Network is a network messaging protocol that allows a variety of
devices such as microcontrollers or other small computers to communicate without the help of a
master or host computer. First developed in the 1980s for interconnecting electronic components
in automobiles, this communications protocol reduced previously hardwired connections to a
simple two wire system (Farsi, Ratcliff, & Barbosa, 1999). Because of its minimal wiring, the
CAN bus has spread to industrial equipment, small electric bikes, and many other uses. This
communications protocol is commonly referred to as the CAN bus and will be referred to as such
henceforth in this paper. The CAN bus is considered a half-duplex system, meaning that devices
can communicate with one another, but not simultaneously. Due to hardware limitations, 110
nodes can be linked together using this protocol, however there is a higher theoretical limit.
Background of CAN
The CAN bus is an excellent solution for many industries due to its two-wire physical
implementation. This puts much greater impetus on the software, where greater complexity can
be achieved in the same physical space. While there is still a limit to the achievable software, the
world has seen great technological advancement in the past few decades and it will continue to
see technology advance and memory sizes and data transfer speeds improve. In order to gain a
full appreciation of the uses and intricacies of the CAN bus, a full overview shall be given on
both the physical and software levels. This overview is given due to the advancement of current
technology and the threat that it poses to general network security it automotive vehicles. As
vehicles that use the CAN bus continue to become connected with the Internet, the potential for
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maligning the purpose of the CAN bus to the detriment of the occupants of the vehicle becomes
exceedingly real. After the overview of the CAN bus, an overview of past, current, and future
threats will be given to demonstrate what the automotive industry must face in the coming years.
After that, one specific issue will be focused on and a potential solution will be proposed that
will help address some of the security concerns expressed earlier in the paper.
The protocol has a four-layer protocol similar to the OSI model. It makes use of the
physical, transfer, object, and applications layers as shown in Figure 1 (Othman, Aji, Fakhreddin,
& Al-Ali, 2006).

Figure 1. Explanation of the CAN bus layer scheme. Reprinted from "Controller area networks: Evolution and
applications" by H.F. Othman, Y.R. Aji, F.T. Fakhreddin, and A.R. Al-Ali, 2006, 2nd International Conference on
Information & Communication Technologies, p. 3088-3093. Copyright 2006 by IEEE. Used by permission.

Using the standard OSI model, this is known as the physical, data link (which
encompasses the object and transfer layers), and application layers. As shown in Figure 1, the
application layer is where the user manipulates and utilizes the CAN bus. The object and transfer
layers combine to form the data link layer from the traditional OSI model. The object layer is
used for the distinction of messages: both filtering handling. The transfer layer has the widest
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breadth of responsibilities, with error detection, fault confinement, validation, acknowledgment,
and other essential syntax and validation duties being performed on this level. The physical layer
is responsible for the actual bit level transportation. The CAN specification in its original form
written by Robert Bosch (2011) details only the Data link and Physical layers of the OSI (Open
Systems Interconnection) model. The OSI model involves seven distinct layers that define the
implementation of communications while primarily ignoring the actual technology underlying
the protocol. The primary purpose of the physical layer is to, “define the encoding of bits into
(electrical or electromagnetic) signals with defined physical characteristics” (Di Natale, 2012, p.
1). Because of the nature of the CAN protocol, the bits can be encoded on either wireless or
wired links from one node to another. However, the original Bosch standard only defined the bit
timing, encoding, and synchronization. This leaves the required current and voltage levels, the
connectors, and other characteristics that are necessary for the definition of the driver, receiver
and physical wiring undefined. Later, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
extended the original specification to include implementation of the physical layer as well as a
discussion of the transfer and application layers, thus allowing for a fully implementable CAN
bus protocol. The Data link layer is made up of the Logical Link Control (LLC) and Medium
Access Control (MAC) layers. Primarily, the LLC provides services for transmission including
remote data request, conditions for accepting messages (message filtering), and ways to
implement recovery and flow management, which is called overload notification (Di Natale,
2012). The MAC layer is essentially the kernel of the CAN bus, responsible for message
framing, arbitration of the medium, acknowledgment, and error detection signaling.
Physical Layer
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To gain a better appreciation for the usage and purpose of the physical layer, it is
important to turn to the original Robert Bosch (2011) specification. This specification was
rewritten to include a flexible data rate, allowing for data speeds greater than one megabit per
second and messages longer than eight bytes per frame. The changes do not affect the physical
layer, so the same specifications are used. Primarily, “the Physical Layer handles bits and defines
how signals are actually transmitted” (Bosch, 2011, p. 4). To delve further into this, the physical
layer handles synchronization, bit timing, and bit encoding. As this is a communications
protocol, the underlying electronics of the mode of transmission and the nodes is left undefined
in order to allow for specialization for each application. Therefore, while a certain network must
have uniformity across all nodes in the implementation of the physical layer, different networks
might have different implementations that share only the concepts outlined (Bosch, 2011).
One implementation, which can be seen in Figure 2, demonstrates how the CAN bus is a
multi-master system, with multiple nodes being both TX (talking) and RX (sharing) nodes. The
CANH is the high signal and the CANL is the low signal. The resistors on each end of the CAN
bus are normally a standardized 120 Ω, which allows the nodes to differentiate between a high
and a low, or a binary zero and one with the zero being high and the one being low (Kang,
Seong, & Lee, 2018). As the CAN bus is a multi-master system, it is vital that a priority-based
system be implemented. The protocol uses a priority addressing which shall be discussed in
greater detail later. Because of the addressing and two wire system, each node must be able to
listen for the bit pushed by other nodes. This means that each node must transmit their bit for a
long enough period of time such that the electrical signal can propagate down the entire network.
This is a limitation imposed on the CAN bus which must be followed, or the user could suffer
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from faulty or overwritten data. As a general rule, the maximum data rate is 1 megabit per
second for a network 40 meters or less in length and 125 kilobits per second for a network 500
meters or less (Burns & Davis, 2013).

Figure 2. Diagram of Physical CAN bus implementation. Reprinted from "Controller area network with flexible
data rate transmitter design with low electromagnetic emission" by S. Kang, J. Seong, & M. Lee, 2018, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology, p. 7290-7298. Copyright 2018 by IEEE. Used by permission.

Another feature of the physical layer is synchronization. The CAN bus implements this in
a fairly simple way. Nodes are not allowed to begin a transmission while another node is
transmitting. This means that when a node starts to transmit the beginning of their inter-frame
space and their priority, all other nodes (even those about to or beginning to transmit)
synchronize with the leading edge of the dominant start of frame bit (which is a zero) (Burns &
Davis, 2013). The overall signal type is of the Non-Return to Zero (NRZ) encoding. This signal
type ensures that there is a high resilience to external disturbance through the use of a recessive
and dominant state (with a logical zero being dominant). Another benefit to this bit encoding is
that there are a minimum number of transitions: times when the bus state changes from dominant
to recessive or vice versa. This is necessary for synchronization and timing. Another way the
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CAN bus protocol accomplishes this is through the use of bit stuffing, which is implemented in
the data link layer and will be discussed further in that section (Di Natale, 2012).
Data Link Layer
The data link layer is the second main layer from the OSI protocol that is defined in the
original and revised CAN bus and CAN FD bus specifications. This layer can be alternatively
referred to as the transfer layer, and is comprised of two sublayers, the Logical Link Control and
the Medium Access Control. The overall purpose of the data link layer is to build off the physical
layer by implementing procedures and protocols for data delivery. In essence, this means that a
data link layer is created to handle collisions, correct possible errors from the physical layer, and
general data delivery. This is true of most data link layers across other technology and is not
extremely different within the CAN bus specifications. Some of the differences include frame bit
stuffing and destuffing, serialization, and acceptance filtering (Bosch, 2011). This next section
looks at a more in depth look of the two distinct sections of this data link layer.
Logical Link Control. The Logical Link Control sublayer of the CAN bus is responsible
for message filtering, overload notification and recovery management. In essence, this means
that it provides the logic sifting through received messages for ones that should be accepted, to
implement remote data requests, to provide messages to the MAC sublayer to be transmitted, and
to send overload notifications. This layer is essentially the gatekeeper for the Data Link Layer.
Each CAN bus frame has an identifier included in the header portion of the message. This
identifier, which will be covered more in the CAN Message Frames section, does not indicate a
specific destination for a message, but instead provides information about the contents such that
other nodes can determine whether or not they should accept and act on the data. This decision to

HARDWARE SECURITY OF THE CAN BUS

10

accept or ignore the message is implemented in the Logical Link Control and called Message
Filtering (Bosch, 2011).
In some cases, a node will request a message of a certain type from the CAN bus. The
Logical Link Control sublayer sends a message frame to the MAC sublayer. The identifier of the
message frame indicates the identifier of the requested message, the data field is completely
empty, the Data Length Code (DLC) field indicates the length of the data of the requested
message, and the Remote Transmission Request (RTR) bit of the arbitration field must be set to
recessive (a logical one) (Di Natale, 2012). Similar to Remote Data Requests, the Logical Link
Control Layer implements overload messages based on three different conditions: internal
conditions, the detection of a dominant bit as the first or second bit of the bus intermission (the
space on the bus in between transmissions), or a given node receiving a dominant bit as the last
bit of an error delimiter or overload delimiter.
Medium Access Control (MAC). The MAC sublayer of the Data Link Layer can be
summarized as the kernel of the CAN bus. As previously mentioned, it is responsible for some of
the core responsibilities of the CAN bus, including, “message framing, arbitration,
acknowledgment, error detection, and signaling” (Bosch, 2011, p. 4). Arguably, a defined
message format is the most important aspect of the CAN bus, and there are four possible formats
under the current CAN specification. These can be found in Figure 3. A unique frame identifier
is given to each command possible on the CAN bus from all nodes. Messages with a lower
number have a higher precedence due to a logical zero being the dominant signal.
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Figure 3. CAN Format Types. Reprinted from "CAN FD specification" by R. Bosch, 2011, Robert Bosch GmbH.
Copyright 2011 by Robert Bosch GmbH. Used by permission.

The arbitration of the messages sent on the CAN bus is achieved through simple protocol
definition. When the bus goes through an idle period, any unit is allowed to start a transmission.
If multiple nodes begin transmitting at the same time, then the identifier is used to determine
who has priority. Because zero is the dominant value, when each bit of the identifier is
transmitted, the bus is pulled to the dominant value. Each transmitting node checks the current
value of the overall bus against the specific bit of the identifier, and if they do not have priority,
then their transmission ceases and they begin listening to the message of the dominant node. This
creates a global priority-based queue that forces messages to be sent according to a fixed priority,
non-pre-emptive schedule.
In Figure 4, a bit-by-bit view of the arbitration process can be seen. Nodes 1, 2, and 3
have differing priorities, and at the start of the frame, they each begin transmitting their message
(beginning with the identifier). As all three messages begin with a dominant bit (logical zero) for
their priority, no node is eliminated, but during the second bit transmission, node 3 withdraws
and becomes a receiver because it transmits the recessive bit (logical one). This occurs again
because each node might have its own clock that is synchronized with the master, the arbitration
process also begins with a re-synchronization to the leading edge of the start-of-frame bit of the
first transmitting node (Davis, Burns, & Bril, 2007). The acknowledgment, error detection, and
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signaling portion are implemented instrumentally in the MAC layer, as all receivers are coded to
check consistency and respond with either an error or an acknowledgment. Error detection has
been implemented through cyclic redundancy checks (CRC), bit stuffing, and message frame
checks. Cyclic redundancy checks are a sequence of bits that help determine whether there are
errors in the message frame. Bit stuffing is introduced to ensure the CAN high and low signals
maintain an average that can differentiate new signals without error. These methods allow
minimal errors and encourage high reliability in the CAN bus.

Figure 4. Demonstration of CAN priority messaging in action. Reprinted from "Understanding and using the
controller area network communication protocol theory and practice" by M. Di Natale, 2012 Springer. Copyright
2012 by Springer Science+Business Media. Used by permission.

Application Layer
The Application Layer is not defined in the Bosch specification document (Bosch, 2011),
however it is commonly included in papers and discussion related to the CAN Bus because it is
the layer in which the user can access and make use of the CAN bus (Othman et al., 2006). To
give some idea of the differing applications, it is possible for a gateway to be implemented that
connects the CAN bus with higher layer protocols in order to provide a measure of interaction
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with the user. This translation of data from CAN bus to a different protocol happens on the
application layer (Di Natale, 2012).
CAN Message Frames
The message frame definition of the CAN bus is necessary to ensure that all nodes
operating on the network can understand each other and defer when they are supposed to. There
are four distinct types of messages that can be sent over the tradition CAN bus definition. These
are the Data Frame, the Remote Request Frame, the Error Frame, and the Overload Frame. All
frames share the same general format, with slight variations. The data frame contains
information (data) from a source to one or more receivers. One data frame has seven distinct
fields that are ordered to allow for efficient communications. The fields are Start of Frame,
Arbitration, Control, Data, CRC, Ack, and End of Frame and a physical representation of it can
be seen in Figure 5. The data field contained within the message can be anywhere from one to
eight bytes long, though some implementations pad messages that are less than eight bytes in
order to achieve consistency.

Figure 5. Current CAN bus data frame. Reprinted from "Understanding and using the controller area network
communication protocol theory and practice" by M. Di Natale, 2012 Springer. Copyright 2012 by Springer
Science+Business Media. Used by permission.
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Any node can begin to transmit a new frame at the end of any interframe space. When the
bus is experiencing interframe space, seven recessive bits (logical one) are read. The first node to
transmit begins sending a data frame, which begins with a start of frame bit delivered in the form
of a dominant bit (a logical zero). This dominant bit interrupts the recessive state of the bus.
Then, the arbitration field begins transmission. This field is intended to convey the priority and
data content of the message. First, the 11-bit identifier is transmitted, then one bit is transmitted
that determines whether the frame is a data frame or a remote request frame. When this bit is
dominant (logical zero), it is a data frame. In the extended CAN message format, the 29-bit
identifier is transmitted by transmitting the first 11 bits, then a recessive bit to delineate between
a normal and extended message. After this, the remaining 18 bits are transmitted, followed by the
bit to determine whether it is a data frame or remote request frame.
The control field begins being transmitted after the arbitration field finishes. The purpose
of the control field is to transmit six bits of information about the content of the message. The
first two bits are predefined in terms of their content. The other four bits are called the Data
Length Content bits which represent how long the data portion of the message is in bytes. After
these bits, the data frame is transmitted. As previously mentioned, this frame can be anywhere
between zero and eight bytes.
The next two fields to be transmitted are the CRC and ACK fields. The CRC (Cyclic
Redundancy Check) is set by determining the coefficients of an input function by the stream of
bytes from the start of frame to the data field followed by 15 zeros (Di Natale, 2012). After
calculating this polynomial, it is divided by the generator found in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. CRC Generator Polynomial. Reprinted from "Understanding and using the controller area network
communication protocol theory and practice" by M. Di Natale, 2012 Springer. Copyright 2012 by Springer
Science+Business Media. Used by permission.

The remainder from this division is the 16-bit CRC field. This choice of polynomial and
CRC specification can be found in the original Bosch specification (2011). The ACK field is a
two-bit field with one bit that records acknowledgments from other receivers and delimits the
message. At the end of all these fields, the end of frame field is transmitted, which is comprised
of a series of seven recessive (logical one) bits. This is also the beginning of interframe space.
The Remote Request Frame is intended to be used by a receiver node to request data from
some other node on the CAN bus. From a formatting standpoint, a remote request frame is
extremely similar to a data frame. One example of the differences is in the Remote Frame bit in
the arbitration field. One bit at the end of the arbitration field is used to determine whether the
message is a Remote Frame Request. If it is a normal data frame, this bit is dominant (logical
zero). In the case of a Remote Request, it is a recessive bit. Also, the data field is omitted, or can
be zero bytes long. The data length code, which is contained within the control field, has a value
between zero and fifteen, which is the length of the message requested.
The Error Frame is much shorter than a data or remote frame, consisting of just two
fields. The first field is the superposition of Error Flags from different stations. The second field
is the error delimiter, which consists of eight error bits. There are two types of error flags: an
active flag and a passive flag. The active error flag is six consecutive dominant bits, and the
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passive error flag is six recessive bits. This is set up such that if a node begins transmitting an
active error flag while some other node is transmitting a passive error flag, the active flag will
overwrite the passive flag. In order to clear the error flag, an error passive node may need the bus
to be idle for at least three bit times.
An overload frame is similar in size to the error frame. Three conditions lead to the
transmission of an overload frame. These include a receiver node has internal conditions such
that the node requires a delay of the next data or remote frame, detection of a dominant bit at the
first or second bit of bus interframe space, or a node sampling a dominant bit of error or overload
frames. Per the Bosch specification, at most two overload frames may be generated to delay new
frames (Bosch, 2011). The overall form of the flags is similar in style and in formatting to the
active and passive error flags.
Current CAN Bus Security
Automobiles and other products that make use of the Controller Area Network must think
about the security of the network they are using. Since its inception, security has primarily been
related to those with physical access. While this is still a valid concern, the possibility of nonphysical attacks (or physical attacks with new malevolent purposes) is growing with the advent
of autonomous vehicles and greater electronic usage within vehicles.
General Security Threats
There are many ways in which individuals may wish to subvert the original intention of
the electronics of the car for their own gain. One example of this is someone attempting to
modify the location data being sent by an internal GPS to confuse or subvert the original
purpose. Other concerns could be attacks on passenger privacy, or even passenger safety in the
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event of an attack directed at a specific component (Wolf, Weimerskirch, & Paar, 2004). These
methods of attack are feasible now more than ever due to the quickly increasing interconnectivity
of an internet-connected world (Groza & Murvay, 2013).
These threats are amplified due to the heavy focus on safety and the low focus on security
from the manufacturers. The low focus on security has a few driving factors, such as the
additional hardware and infrastructures that need to be implemented. Other factors include
increased security causing processing delays as more data must be processed, and a significantly
increased cost. The cost aspect also comes into play as vehicle manufacturers would need to hire
engineers and computer scientists as security specialists and spend the money to implement the
previously mentioned infrastructure.
Attacks towards a network such as an in-vehicle CAN bus are generally thought of as
vulnerabilities primarily physical in nature. This is due to the traditional need for physical access
from a mechanical viewpoint. The OBD2 port in vehicles is the primary nature by which
mechanics can read and interact with the internal diagnostics of the vehicle. A malicious attacker
could theoretically insert a node onto the CAN bus that subverts the true intentions, however this
also requires material presence by some entity to install the required hardware. This
presupposition generally leads to a reduced focus on security by vehicle manufacturers and other
CAN network users, however this presupposition becomes increasingly flawed with the advent
and the growth of an internet-connected world. Even some mobile phone application stores have
self-diagnostic applications that allow a driver (or other user) to view and interface with the
internal state of the CAN bus. If a malicious application writer manages to infect a smart device
with an application that has the propensity to connect to the CAN bus, it is feasible that the
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attacker can be anywhere in the world and affect the internal state of the vehicle (Woo, Jo, &
Lee, 2015). A potential visualization of this is demonstrated in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Over the Air Attack on CAN bus. Reprinted from "Security in automotive telematics: A survey of threats
and risk mitigation strategies to counter the existing and emerging attack vectors" by A. Oyler & H. Saiedian, 2016
Security & Communication Networks, p. 4330-4340. Copyright 2016 by Wiley Online Library. Used by permission.

Still other attacks can combine the remote access technique with compromising a
physical component of the vehicle. In one example, this could involve the tire pressure sensors
that send data over radio waves to a transponder that relays the information over the CAN bus.
By intercepting and replacing radio waves, the transponder is compromised and can be forced to
send unauthorized data (Studnia et al., 2013). The individual components of the car can be
compromised, and the malicious data can be delivered in a few ways. A node may send messages
related to a different ECU, however because the CAN bus is a multicast system, it is impossible
to tell the origin. This can be replicated across other systems, even as simple as causing a
window that the driver is not attempting to open to be opened through a subverted node (Hoppe,
Kiltz, & Dittmann, 2008).
CAN Bus Security Techniques
The CAN bus defined in the Bosch specification (2011) is primarily secured through
physical separation between it and any would-be attackers. This is changing in part due to
internet-connected components and the ability for people to influence the lower level
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communications of vehicles from differing locations. Because of this, there are few security
techniques that are standardly implemented. This paper will include a discussion of these
techniques, as well as more niche techniques that are gaining prominence or have significant
merit. It should be noted that this list is by no means exhaustive, and many other techniques
undoubtedly exist that protect the CAN bus.
One such protocol that has merit is the technique known as CANAuth (Van Herrewege,
Singelee, & Verbauwhede, 2011). CANAuth is a protocol that follows the specifications of CAN
in great deal but adds a security component specially designed to comply with existing CAN
protocols. This is in place in order to allow for backwards compatibility with existing CAN
networks. The security implemented by CANAuth follows the CAN specification by not
attempting to authenticate sources (as sources can broadcast to a whole network), but rather
authenticate message IDs. This removes the traditionally held view of authentication that verifies
whether a source is permitted to send the receiver a message and instead focuses on the strength
of the CAN bus, namely that it is a multi-master system. Because the number of possible
messages in the CAN bus can range from hundreds with the 11-bit identifier, to millions with the
29-bit identifier, it is impractical to store a key for each message. Instead, CANAuth attempts to
mitigate this issue by associating keys to acceptance codes and masks. Unfortunately, a major
flaw in this plan is that there are often external tools that are allowed to connect to and access the
CAN bus, such as On-Board Diagnostics (OBD) tools. If an authentication through message key
is given to manufacturers of these tools and distributed to the public, it is impossible to guarantee
security (Groza B. , Murvay, van Herrewege, & Verbauwhede, 2012).
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Another referenced protocol is the TESLA like protocols that have been shown to be
effective in sensor networks. TESLA stands for “Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant
Authentication” (Perrig, Canetti, Tygar, & Song, 2000, p. 2). While it has sufficient speeds for
sensor networks, where quick transmission of data is important, there is too much of an
authorization delay to be small enough to allow for the speeds required by the CAN bus.
CaCAN, or “Centralized Authentication System in CAN (Controller Area Network)”
(Kurachi, et al., 2014, p. 1) is another protocol that is currently under investigation. To secure the
CAN bus, the authors propose a monitor node that shares a different cryptographic key with each
node on the bus. Then, the bus calculates the proper message authentication code (MAC). If it
detects an illicit message, it can overwrite the message using an error frame, as seen in Figure 8.
This effectively destroys the message. These MAC codes are transmitted during the data portion
of the frame, effectively shortening the amount of data that can be transmitted during a frame. As
with many of these protocols, they effectively prevent unauthorized traffic from joining the bus
in the form of a new node (Kurachi, et al., 2014).

Figure 8. CaCAN representation. Reprinted from "CaCAN: centralized authentication system in CAN" by R.
Kurachi et. al, 2014. Embedded Security in Cars, p. 2-10. Copyright 2014 by ResearchGate. Used by permission.
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Beyond normal security techniques such as new protocols or a modified frame, there are
techniques that involve changing the way message identification numbers are defined. Generally,
this is predefined, and this will still be true, however, under a new technique, the numbers could
be run through a filtering algorithm that uses hash keys to generate a different number and learn
from the messages being sent. When the learning algorithm is applied in practice, it can sense
between multiple types of attacks. (Groza & Murvay, 2018). This technique would be
implemented in the software level of CAN networks. Similarly, the CAN bus can be outfitted
with a connection to a small computer than analyzes CAN messages and uses a neural network to
process data and find threats (Min-Joo & Kang, 2016).
This section has looked at a variety of the types of protocols or techniques that can be
used to protect the CAN bus from malicious or unauthorized traffic. While many of these
solutions take into account current protocols and lead into designs that can support the limited
data rates of the CAN bus (Lin & Sangiovanni-Vincentelli, 2012), there is still an aspect of
securing the CAN bus that must be explored in more detail. Because the reception of a CAN bus
frame is a network defined, consistent thing, it is possible to keep the same frame width and
adjust the contents slightly. This will be discussed in the following section.
Securing the CAN Bus
The CAN bus continues to be the de facto standard for automobiles, even as consumers
progress into an ever-increasingly interconnected smart world. The two-wire implementation
makes it a staple pin of intra-vehicular communications and allows for software definition of
much of the load of logical control of a vehicle. It is upon this notion that this paper builds the
idea of a new security standard.
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CAN Bus Security Vulnerability
While much of the strength of the CAN bus comes in its inherent multicasting ability, this
opens the large security vulnerability of any sender on the network being able to send messages
of any type. Furthermore, as self-diagnostic applications (discussed in the section General
Security Threats) and other third-party tools allow unauthorized traffic on the CAN bus, not only
physical threats can compromise the integrity of the information found in the network. Because
of this, a strategy must be examined to determine which nodes are authorized to send messages
on a given network. While a solution in this vein does not necessarily address all security issues,
it provides a stronger base for the CAN bus to reside in and makes it more difficult for malicious
entities to compromise the integrity of the network. The following proposal is designed to meet
the goals and should be treated as a framework to be investigated.
Proposed Solution
In order to verify nodes, it is possible for a modification to be made to the CAN bus
frame. Using even one byte from the overall frame allows 256 different node identifiers to be
implanted into a standard CAN frame. Having a node identifier allows for other nodes to verify
that the message currently being transmitted is a valid CAN message. Should a node join the
network and attempt to transmit a message, other CAN nodes will be able to recognize the lack
of an identifier or the presence of an incorrect identifier and throw an error as they would during
a different error state. This identifier should be randomly assigned during the initial setup of the
CAN bus, as this allows for pre-identification of verified nodes. Figure 9 shows the proposed
modification to the CAN bus data frame. The portion in red is the additional field added to the
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original specifications for the CAN bus, and its length and definition will be discussed further
later in the paper.

Figure 9. Proposed Modification to CAN Data Frame

Software implementation. From a software standpoint, this addition holds considerable
merit. Because nodes have knowledge of allowable node identifiers stored in non-volatile
memory, they can check whether a message is authorized during normal processing of the data
frame. However, a modification on this idea allows for a more secure network. During the
software definition of each node on the CAN bus, they are loaded with the message identifiers of
the messages relevant to their purpose. While this number could be thousands of messages or
more, the number of nodes it can receive CAN data frames from is a significantly lower number.
Due to hardware limitations, the number maxes out at 110 nodes (Othman et al., 2006).
Therefore, each node should only store a list of which nodes’ identifiers they can accept
messages from. Should they receive a message identifier that appears to be relevant information,
but the node identifier is not recognized, an error frame would be thrown. This protects from
unauthorized nodes spoofing messages that may have high criticality and sending them to focal
points within the CAN bus.
Field placement. As shown in the section CAN Message Frames, the CAN bus has seven
distinct fields. A start of frame bit begins the transmission stage, then the arbitration field allows
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the highest priority message to transmit. The control field is used to represent the length of the
message, which can be up to eight bytes under the original specifications (Bosch, 2011). This is
used by the receivers of the message to determine which bytes to pay attention to as the data
field. Because the data field has a modifiable length, it is a natural choice for the removal of
some capacity. Using one byte (eight bits) leaves seven-byte messages still able to be sent while
simultaneously upholding the current CAN standards for frame size. This allows the proposed
system to be usable with previously existing systems with only a software change and without
modification to hardware. While one byte is the standard example used in this paper, it is
important to note that it is by no means a limit. Because it is a data-link-layer-defined
modification on the original CAN bus specifications, each system can use a separate number of
bytes to increase the maximum possible number of node identifiers. The length of this field is
easily determined by the maximum number of data bytes allowed in the system. The security
provided by this modification increases with each additional bit devoted to the identifier, but no
standard number should be set as different networks may have differing portions of their data
frame available to put towards this improvement. In the CAN FD specification, up to 64 bytes
can be used in the data field (Bosch, 2011). It is up to each network configurator to determine
what is best for their network, however security increases with the number of bits devoted to a
node identifier.
Discussion on security. This proposal strongly shores up the CAN data frame. It adds the
concept of a verified sender, which prohibits pre-existing and new nodes from sending or
requesting data frames from where they are not allowed. This strength is offset somewhat by the
relative ease for a computer to cycle through node identifiers until it chances upon a correct
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match. This is where it is important for each manufacturer to focus on the general structure of the
messages of their system and allow as many bits as possible for the node identifier. For example,
Equation 1 shows the difference between one byte (eight bits) and two bytes (sixteen bits) worth
of node identifier possibilities. While these are not the longest identifiers, it is difficult to raise
the ceiling of how long they are both because it takes away from the data portion of the frame
and because it increases the processing time of each node. Therefore, it is up to each network
designer to determine how many bits should be allocated for a node identifier.

28 = 256; 216 = 65,536

(1)

There are a few notable areas in which this proposition does not directly shore up
security. First, if a node should be compromised by a third party, that third party would be able
to send normal messages on the CAN bus. However, if they attempted to send new messages that
target specific nodes that are outside the normal operation of the node they have compromised,
that message would be flagged and overwritten by an Error Frame. Should a node with
considerable reach be jeopardized, it will be able to send messages to important nodes that could
still impact the safety of the occupants or their information. Therefore, it is important to note that
while this increases security across the board, it is not a comprehensive solution.
Conclusion
The CAN bus has maintained a hold over the automobile industry for decades. While the
fact that it is still relevant and useful is telling of its robustness and benefit, it is important that it
be adapted to fit with the times. It is impossible to ignore the threat of an ever-increasingly
interconnected world and the danger that it poses in the form of physical and non-physical
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malicious attacks on vehicular transport. Coupled with the increasingly software-oriented design
of cars, there are a growing number of ways to subvert the true intentions of the manufacturers.
With solutions such as those proposed in this paper, the CAN bus can be shored up and built to
last for the next generation of vehicles.
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